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Abstract
A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt
public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two
dimensions. First, corrupt public institutions operate by offering con-
tracts without competition and more corrupt entities channel larger
share of their budget in this way. Second, these firms enjoy extra
returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best en-
trepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all pub-
lic procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay, amount-
ing annually to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, is then used
to corroborate these predictions.
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Public procurement of goods and services is one of the main areas at risk of
corruption in developing countries where regulations and legal enforcement
are weak. On top of the static cost of corruption and fund embezzlement,
systematic departures from competition in the attribution of public markets
are likely to have a devastating impact on economic agents’ incentives and
as a result on these countries’ productive structure. This paper presents the
first large scale micro-level evidence on the channels of rent-seeking and its
impact on economic development, using a unique database of nearly 50,000
public procurement operations in Paraguay, covering the period 2004 to 2007.
In a nutshell, we show that in Paraguay corrupt behavior in the allocation of
public contracts is a key channel for rent-seeking. This large-scale network
of favoritism, sometimes coined “la patria contratista”,1 has deeply damag-
ing economic consequences: public institutions buy goods and services at
inflated prices, and the set of incentives facing potential entrepreneurs is
biased towards unproductive activities.
To guide the analysis, we model the choice of formal entrepreneurs with
idiosyncratic cost levels, between serving private consumers competitively,
or joining a rent-seeking sector, where they sell to public institutions. In
this rent sector, contracts are attributed by corrupt officials, who distort
allocation rules in exchange for bribes. Firms willing to do business with the
Government must therefore be profitable enough to cover their production
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costs as well as the bribes. We derive from the model two main sets of
predictions that are sustained by the data, revealing the following story.
First, we establish that in Paraguay the main channel for corruption
in procurement is the systematic use of an “exceptional” purchase mecha-
nism, which bypasses legally required minimum standards of transparency
and competition and is used much more frequently than what should be ex-
pected from international best practice. Using the whole panel dimension of
the data, we show that this type of corruption is used more by institutions-
firms pairs that trade repeatedly and in large volumes. Moreover, we exploit
a natural experiment, linked to an exogenous change in public monitoring fol-
lowing the widely publicized release midway through our period of study of an
NGO report flagging up exception as a key channel for corruption, and show
that its use decreased significantly for these pairs boasting frequent interac-
tions. Finally, we also provide evidence that this channel dominates other
more “traditional” ways to rig procurement contracts, such as the breaking
down of lots in amounts that escape the obligation for open tenders.
Second, this implies that firms making more business with the State,
those in the so-called rent sectors, enjoy above normal rates of return and
are the most efficient ones. We provide evidence of these two aspects, by
showing that firms selling more to the public sector, as well as those selling
more through the exception channel, have higher profit margins, despite the
fact that they trade mostly in standard goods and should face competition
for the market.
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As a result, public intervention in markets distort firms’ incentives by
inducing additional entry in activities with an important procurement com-
ponent. To the extent that this self-selection process pushes some of the best
potential entrepreneurs towards rent sectors, it generates a misallocation of
talents across the economy. Indeed, we document this strong selection bias
by exploiting an original econometric strategy using firms’ names.
The paper concludes that in the case of Paraguay, the release of the 2006
TI report and the subsequent change in exposition to public scrutiny had an
important positive impact on the overall efficiency of the public procurement
process. As it made obvious the involvement of the civil society in monitoring
the use of public funds, and spurred an increase in the interest of the media,
it generated a change in the behavior of the public sector with respect to the
use of exceptional procedures, especially so where the use of exception was
motivated by corrupt deals.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main
strands of related literature and spells out the contributions of the paper.
Section 3 describes the Paraguayan institutional environment and reviews
procurement practices over our period of study. Section 4 develops the model
and derives empirical predictions. Section 5 presents the data. Sections 6 and
7 present the results related to the two main sets of theoretical predictions,
and Section 8 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
The idea that rent-seeking behavior has important social and economic costs
is a relatively long-standing one in the economic and political science liter-
ature. Early contributions such as Tullock (1967; 1971), Buchanan (1980),
Krueger (1974) and Baghwati (1982), were concerned, mostly in a theoreti-
cal framework, with the different types of costs associated with the transfer
of rents and the waste generated by agents engaging time and resources in
competing for rents, for example through political lobbying or corruption.
More recently, some papers have provided explanations for ways in which
rent-seeking entails dynamic costs. Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1991) focus for example on the resulting dysfunctional allocation of
talents. In this approach, potential investments in physical or human capital
are directed to rent-abundant sectors (such as those stemming from political
favors, corruption or exploitation of natural resources), while investments in
innovative activities, which have greater growth potential, become relatively
less attractive and are discouraged. As supporting empirical evidence, Mur-
phy et al. (1991) present cross-country growth regressions augmented with
country level proportions of engineering and law students, where the former
are said to correspond to investments in productive activities while the latter
are considered rent-seekers. Baumol’s evidence, on the other hand, is based
on historical accounts from Rome, Ancient China and the Middle Ages.
To date, there is still limited micro-evidence on the actual channels and
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consequences of rent-seeking in developing economies. Following Fisman’s
(2001) seminal contribution, some papers have stressed the performance pre-
mium of connected firms (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003; Fries, Ly-
senko and Polanec, 2003; Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2004). Other
contributions have documented the importance of political connections in
securing access to key economic inputs, such as credit (Li, Meng, Wang
and Zhou, 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), tax advantages or foreign ex-
change (Hsieh, Miguel, Ortega and Rodriguez, 2011), or favorable regulations
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). At a more general level, the large literature
on corruption that developed since the 1990s is also relevant here, and es-
pecially the strand of more recent papers using microeconomic evidence to
directly measure corruption and its effects on outcomes.2
A few contributions have dealt specifically with public procurement. Hyyti-
nen, Lundberg and Toinaven (2007), who study the effects of politics on mu-
nicipal cleaning contracts in Sweden, show that the lowest bidder does not
win 58% of the time and that the choice of the winner is subject to political
considerations; Goldman, Rocholl and So (2013) show that US companies
connected, through the composition of their boards, to the winning party in
both legislative and presidential elections (in 1994 and 2000) are significantly
more likely to have experienced an increase in procurement contracts. Ref-
erences dealing explicitly with corruption include Di Tella and Schargrodsky
(2003), who document the impact of a crackdown on corruption in Argen-
tinean hospitals, and Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009), who disentangle
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the effect of passive (inefficiency) versus active waste (corruption) in Italy,
finding that the former accounts for about four times the effect of the latter,
and Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2012), who analyze the link between corrupt
procurement and campaign financing in Russia. Relatedly, Davis (2004),
and Deiniger and Mpuga (2004) analyze the impact of corruption on public
service delivery in South Africa and Uganda respectively.
With respect to this literature, our paper provides two main contribu-
tions. First, we have data not only on the expenses realized by public insti-
tutions, but also on the firms that are on the selling side. This enables us
to capture the effect of large scale corrupt practices on the profitability of
firms and hence on the industrial structure of the economy.3 We provide evi-
dence of the distortive effects of rent-seeking in terms of economic efficiency,
by showing that it implies an inefficient specialization of the more able en-
trepreneurs in imports and procurement activities. Second, we document one
of the most prevalent channels of corruption in procurement activity, namely
the use of purchase mechanisms circumventing standard competitive rules,
and uncover the economic characteristics of the institutions and sectors more
prone to it.
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3 Rent-Seeking and Corruption in Paraguayan
Procurement
Paraguay is considered to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world.4
Our period of study is part of a non-interrupted 61 years spell, including the
1954-1989 Stroessner dictatorship, in which the Colorado party governed the
country. At the heart of the system was the distribution of public employ-
ment and contracts to its supporters, and the exclusion of its opposition.5 An
important channel for corruption, which we focus on here, was the allocation
of public contracts to firms that in most cases were created with the sole
purpose of supplying the state, often by selling a wide variety of imported
goods. As a result of the ample anecdotal evidence of corruption in pub-
lic procurement, and under pressure from international organizations, a law
regulating public procurement practices (law 2051/03) was enacted in 2003
by the government of the newly elected president Nicanor Duarte Frutos,
with the announced intention of promoting transparency and efficiency in
public purchases. The most significant of its provisions were the creation of
a public procurement watchdog (the National Directorate of Public Procure-
ment, or DNCP), the design of a menu of purchase mechanisms to regulate
procurement procedures, and the compulsion to make all information (calls,
providers, award, etc.) public. This last proviso was accompanied by the
creation of the DNCP web site where this information is available, but in
practice access is often intermittent and the interface is impractical.
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There are strong indications however that improvements in the regula-
tory framework did not translate quickly into cleaner procurement practices,
partly because many officials did not comply with the new law and the wrong-
doings continued. The main mechanism through which firms were favored is
the use of the exceptional purchase mechanism, by which specific regulations,
such as the obligation to organize public tenders above certain amounts, were
disregarded (see details in Section 5 below). In 2006, Transparencia Paraguay
(TP), the local chapter of Transparency International, published an extensive
report sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) focusing
on the excessive use of exceptional procedures, which was clearly identified
as one of the main irregularities in the procurement process.6 The Electricity
State-owned enterprise ANDE has for instance been pointed out for buying
large numbers of electric transformers in this way over the years, despite
the fact that these are routinely required by the firm for network repairs.
Firm officials recognize that this practice usually generates excess pricing of
between 17 and 27%.7
Because the report was given ample coverage in the local media and
through public presentations, and its recommendations were subsequently
relayed by the IDB-World Bank Paraguayan public procurement evaluation
panel, the officials in charge of procurement in public institutions and firms
became more cautious. Indeed, in 2004 and 2005 purchases made through the
“exceptional” procedure amounted to nearly 24% of the total procurement
spending. In the period 2006-2007 the share of purchases made through
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the “exceptional” procedure decreased to 13%. We exploit this “natural
experiment”, by showing that the specific pairs of institutions and firms that
we identify as irregularly using exception in the first subperiod, subsequently
experienced the largest reduction in its use.
The next Section builds a model of corrupt procurement, from which
we derive predictions that we exploit to conduct an empirical analysis of
corruption in public purchases in Paraguay.
4 The Model
The model focuses on the formal sector of the economy as formal firms are
the only ones allowed to compete for public markets. The production func-
tions involve constant returns to scale technologies.8 The cost function of a
producer operating in the formal sector is C(q) = cq, where by assumption
A1 c is independently and uniformly distributed in [0, c].
Entrepreneurs in the formal sector have the choice between procuring
commodities for the public sector, where, as corruption prevails, they make
rents, or doing business in the private sector where they serve consumers
competitively. As a benchmark, we first briefly discuss the corruption-free
equilibrium. In the absence of rent-seeking opportunities, entrepreneurs serve
market demand competitively and make no rents. Competitive pressure helps
to select the best available technology so that in equilibrium the price equates
the lowest marginal cost, p∗ = 0, and quantities traded in the private sector
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are D(p∗). Welfare is maximized.
Rent-Seeking: We now turn to the case, denoted by the superscript r,
where corruption prevails in public purchase. While in practice corruption
and bribes are not observed, the model based on assuming the existence of
corruption will generate a number of testable predictions discussed below.
Optimal procurement rules specify that for large purchase above given
thresholds it is mandatory to organize a competitive tender (see Auriol 2006),
and to advertise the calls to encourage submissions by firms. In practice it
is not always possible to organize a competitive tender, for instance because
the commodity is patented, or there is an emergency. To deal with these
specifics cases, public procurement rules include an “exceptional purchase”
procedure. When they rely on this type of procedure, public purchasers are
able to bypass the competition phase. This is the easiest way to favor a
firm in exchange of a bribe. Auriol (2006) shows that for large purchases
a corrupted procurement official favors limited tendering procedures (i.e.,
exceptional purchase), thereby maximizing the price of the purchase and his
bribe.9 We thus expect corrupt Paraguayan public institutions to rely on the
exceptional purchase mechanism to collect bribes over large purchases.
Firms selection in the rent sector : The public purchaser chooses how
many firms should be included in the rent sector and creates a lot for each
of them out of his/her total budget. A firm invited to procure one of these
lots through exceptional purchase is in a monopoly position. It can ask for
the highest possible unit price c. In the rent sector a contract of size q > 0
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hence costs cq. The government officials choose b ∈ [0, 1], the share of cq
they take as a bribe in exchange for giving this market to a firm without
competition.10 We deduce that, in the rent sector, the profit of a firm with
cost c ∈ [0, c] and lot size q > 0 is:
Π(c) = q(c− c)− bcq (1)
To access the rent sector the firm must pay bcq. Since bcq is independent
of the cost of the firm, the bribe is equivalent to a fixed cost which screens
out the less efficient firms. Let cr(b) ∈ [0, c] denotes the firm that is just
indifferent between the rent and the private sector: Π(cr(b)) = 0. Since the
bribe is a fraction of the market value (i.e., it is linear in cq), the value cr(b)
is independent of q. It is straightforward to check that
cr(b) = c (1− b). (2)
We deduce that if c < cr(b) then Π(c) = q[cr(b)− c] > 0. In the public sector
rents are made and different types of firms coexist because corruption creates
artificial barriers to entry. By contrast entrepreneurs with costs higher than
cr(b) would make a loss, and so prefer to serve private demand. It is intuitive
that the share of firms in the rent sector, c
r(b)
c
= 1− b < 1, decreases with b.
The more greedy government representatives are, the more profitable firms
need to be to do business with them: they need to be able to cover their cost
plus the bribes and still make non-negative profit.
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Optimal bribe rate: By choosing b ∈ [0, 1] the public purchaser chooses
how many firms enter the rent sector. Then she attributes to each firm with
a marginal cost lower than cr(b) a lot. In our database the lots qij > 0 vary
depending on the identity of the purchaser (institution j) and of the seller
(firm i). As shown by equation (2) our results are independent of the exact
size of the lots and on their distribution among the firms in the rent sector,
so we leave them unspecified. The only constraint is that the lots are positive
in value and that their sum is equal to the available budget. To compute
the optimal bribe rate, public officials internalize the risk of corruption being
detected and punished.11 We assume that the greedier the public purchaser
(i.e., the higher b the bribe rate) the higher the risk of detection.12 That
is, the probability of detection is G(b) ∈ [0, 1], where G(b) is a distribution
function and g(b) = G′(b) > 0 is the associated density function defined over
[0, 1] satisfying the monotone hazard rate property:13
A2 1−G(b)
g(b)
is decreasing in b
Consistently with empirical evidence we focus on weak punishment: in
case of detection the bribe is lost to the officials.14 For a purchase of to-
tal size Q, the net expected rent of the public purchaser then writes B =
bcQ (1−G(b)). To avoid being excluded from the lucrative bribes business,
the public purchaser needs to split the budget among enough firms (i.e.,
to choose a low enough b). This captures in a simple way the fact that
Paraguay at the time of the study was a patronage economy. Indeed, the
Colorado party was able to maintain itself in power for 61 years by sharing
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among its followers the windfall from power through corrupted deals.
We deduce the next result.




Entrepreneurs choose the rent sector if and only if
c < c(1− br) (4)
Under assumption A2 it is easy to check that br solution of (3) exists and
is unique.15
Proposition 1 indicates that the most productive entrepreneurs choose the
rent sector where there is no competition and commodities are overpriced,
so that they make rent (i.e., Π(c) = q[cr(b) − c] > 0 for all c < (1 − br)c).
The model captures the essence of the redistribution mechanism among the
Paraguayan elite: only the firms with the lowest cost are included in the
corrupted deals. Firms with high cost (i.e., those with little physical and
social capital, run by poorly educated and connected managers, etc) are left
to serve private demand. We deduce that entrepreneurs who choose to do
business with the government are the most efficient ones and they make
rents. Compared to a corruption-free economy, prices are higher so that the
quantities consumed in equilibrium are smaller, leading to lower aggregate
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production.16
In practice procurement activities are decentralized at the institution level
(ministries, state enterprises, etc.), so for the empirical analysis b should
be thought of as institution-specific. Corruption detection varies from one
institution to another. They differ in their level of exposure to public scrutiny,
depending for example on how many people are harmed by corruption or on
how politically sensitive their activities are. They also differ in their capacity
to realize and hide corrupt acts. A simple way to formalize this in the context
of the model is in terms of hazard rate dominance, which implies stochastic
dominance.17 We deduce easily the next result.
Proposition 2 Let G(.) and K(.) be two distributions of probability of cor-
ruption detection such that g(b)
1−G(b) ≤ k(b)1−K(b) ∀b ∈ [0, 1]. Let brG and brK be
defined in equation (3) with distributions G(.) and K(.) respectively. Then
brG ≥ brK.
Institutions characterized by a lower probability of detection (i.e., lower
hazard rate) will be less cautious to hide corruption and will ask for more
bribes. It implies that the average lot size, q = Q
1−b , which increases with
b, will be larger for those institutions.18 It is intuitive that when the public
officials are more greedy there are less firms that are able to survive in the
rent sector and that their lots size is then larger. At the institution level, we
hence expect a correlation between the frequency of exceptional purchases,
which is our marker for corruption, and the average market shares attributed
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to providers.
Summary of empirical predictions: Our theoretical results lead to two
main sets of predictions that we take to the data in the following order,
using several complementary empirical strategies.
• First, according to proposition 2, institutions characterized by a lower
probability of detection rely more heavily on exceptional purchase and
have larger lots size attributed to their providers. In Section 6, we test
this prediction in two steps. In the first one, we discuss in details why
in Paraguay the use of exceptional purchase mechanisms can be con-
sidered a marker for corruption. We then establish that more corrupt
institutions do indeed attribute larger lots to their providers through
the exceptional purchase mechanism.
• Second, following proposition 1, entrepreneurs who enter the procure-
ment sector are the most efficient ones and they are making positive
rents. We test this prediction in Section 7.
5 The Data
Procurement data19
The main data set tracks all the procurement transactions made over the
period 2004 to 2007 between 73 public entities (representing over 90% of to-
tal Paraguayan public spending and employment) and 5,517 different private
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suppliers.20 These 47,615 public purchases include all types of goods and ser-
vices, from stationary to machinery, oil purchases, food, services, etc. There
are good reasons to believe that no public procurement operations escape
registration as, under the new system, contracts need to be registered and
executed before the corresponding funds are released. Total public spending
over the whole period amounts to Gs. 12,400 bn. (approx. US$ 2,235m),21
which represents between 5.5% and 6.9% of Paraguay’s yearly GDP.
The distribution of contract values has a fat left-hand tail with 84% of
purchases costing less than 2000 minimum daily wage (mdw), while 5.5%
of contracts costing over 10,000 mdw make up 86% of the total spending.
The sample mean is approximately US$ 47,000, equivalent to 36 times the
national per capita GDP at the time.22
Each observation in the procurement data set contains the name and type
of the public entity, the name and legal registration number (RUC) of the
supplying firm and its owner, and information on the purchase including the
nature of the good or service categorized in 25 different groups, the total cost
in local currency, and the purchase mechanism used.
Purchase mechanisms are a key provision of the 2003 public procurement
law, regulating the procedures to be followed in allocating contracts depend-
ing on their total value. There are five legal purchase mechanisms with
gradually increasing constraints on the minimum number of offers, the mode
and length of publication of the call for offers, and the attribution procedure.
Finally, these guidelines can be disregarded in cases of emergency, such
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as natural disasters or health epidemics, for the purchase of patented and
copyrighted goods, or for purchases requiring defense secrecy. In those ex-
traordinary circumstances, public officials can skip all formal purchase re-
quirements through the so-called exceptional purchase mechanism. In our
sample, exceptional purchases are quite common for certain categories of
goods or services, such as rentals, advertisement, consultancy and transport.
Tax ranking data
We use annual rankings of top taxpayers published on the Ministry of
Finance’s web site. Firms’ ranks are determined by their total payments on
all taxes.23 Once public firms are excluded, we have information for 748 firms
in 2004, 459 firms in 2005, 482 firms in 2006, and 478 firms in 2007.
Import-export data
We also include annual rankings from the Customs’ SOFIA official data
base. These include the full universe of importers from 2004 to 2007, includ-
ing the total free on board (FOB) value imported, and of exporters for the
same period, including the cost, insurance, freight (CIF) value exported.24
Institution-level corruption indices
We introduce institution-level corruption indices for a subset of 13 insti-
tutions in our sample. In total, this covers 15,640 of our initial observations,
equivalent to 32.8% of the total. These indices were developed by the NGO
Transparencia Paraguay between 2004 and 2008.
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6 Corruption and the Structure of Purchases
It is useful to discuss the claim that the use of exceptional purchases is the
main channel for corruption in the context we study. Three aspects are rel-
evant here. First of all, as mentioned in Section 3, there is ample anecdotal
evidence supporting this claim, in particular the report by Transparencia
Paraguay (2005), which has been widely publicized. Second, the use of such
procedure in the Paraguayan context vastly exceeds comparable figures from
around the world. For instance, in a sample of Brazilian health procure-
ment contracts between 2004 and 2009, exceptions amount to approximately
9%.25 Similarly, from 2006 to 2010, only 7% of EU procedures were “nego-
tiated without publication”, corresponding to 5% of the value share of total
procurement contracts above the EU threshold for mandatory call for ten-
der.26 By means of comparison, the equivalent figure in Paraguay in the
two years period before the publication of Transparencia Paraguay (2006),
looking at contracts above the 2,000 mdw threshold for mandatory call for
tender, is 20.4% of all awards. In terms of share of total contract value, it
climbs to 23.8%.
Finally, it is worth noting that estimations not shown here to save space
provide evidence that none of our results go through when using as a marker
of corruption an other commonly mentioned channel for corruption in pro-
curement, namely the practice of breaking down contracts in smaller lots so
that they can be attributed without competition. This is true using as depen-
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dent variable an indicator of whether the contract lies in a 10 or 20% value
band just below the threshold that implies mandatory open tender. This
shows that in the context of generalized corruption prevailing in Paraguay,
public purchasers were careless and used the simplest procedure available to
favor firms.
Going to the estimations, note that our unit of observation is the indi-
vidual purchase. Corruption being in most cases not observed, our identifi-
cation strategy, following the model, relies on documenting the link between
the frequency of non-competitive procedures (i.e., exceptions), the intensity
of firm-institution relationships (i.e., the lot size in the model), as well as
institution-level detection proneness (i.e., the detection functions). Each of
the 47,615 purchases available corresponds to a pair composed of a firm i
and an institution j. Our sample of 73 institutions and 5517 firms generates
a total of 13,693 different “active” pairs, with an average number of con-
tracts equal to 3.5 (std. dev. 10.5), a minimum of 1 (for 7,215 pairs) and a
maximum of 460.
We estimate the following basic model:
excijkt = θj + θk + θt +Xijtβ1 + εijkt, (5)
where exc is a binary variable equal to 1 if the contract over good k procured
from firm i by institution j in year t is made through the exception, and
θ′s are institution (j), good (k), and year (t) fixed effects. We use a linear
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probability model to estimate the model above.27
The fixed effects allows us to capture any systematic determinants of
exceptional purchase that would correspond to characteristics of the goods
(patented or monopolistic goods, exclusive dealing) and the institutions (specif-
ically dedicated to attend emergencies, involved in defense deals, etc., possi-
bly with changes over time), as well as specific time fluctuations or trend in
the use of exceptions. Once these fixed effects are introduced, we expect no
additional features to be significant if procurement rules are applied correctly.
Our explanatory variables of interest Xijt are firm-institution level ones:
the total value of each pair’s transactions and the proportion of an institu-
tion’s transactions done with each particular provider, year by year. These
are two measures of the lot size described in the model. Our model signals
as a symptom of corruption the fact that institutions, which do more excep-
tion for that purpose do that through the attribution of larger lots to their
providers (i.e., a more corrupt public purchaser asks for larger bribes which
reduces the number of firms able to pay them, and increases their average
lot size see Proposition 2).
Table 1 contains the results from (5). In column 1, which report the esti-
mation with institution, goods and year fixed effects, the larger the share of
an institution’s transactions done with each particular provider, the higher
the probability that the contract is made through exception, an effect sig-
nificant at the 5% level. This is robust to adding both institution-year and
goods-year fixed effects in column 2.28 The marginal effect implies that an
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institution increasing the share of its total procurement volume allocated to
a particular firm from 0.9% to 3.8% of its portfolio (that is by one standard
deviation above the sample mean), would increase the share of its contracts
with that particular firm made through the exception by 36%.29 In Column
3, where we add a full set of firm fixed-effect, the significance is lost, which
is not very surprising considering the number of additional parameters (over
5,000).
[insert Table 1 here]
Proposition 2 suggests that institutions more exposed to public scrutiny
use less exceptional purchase. We use the institution-level corruption indices
described in the data section to proxy for this exposure. We measure cor-
ruption with a synthetic index equal to the arithmetic mean of three original
indices, namely the evaluations based on the Comptroller General’s report,
the number of administrative indictments in any given institution, and the
number of newspaper articles mentioning corruption in each institution.
We introduce the following specification, where we expect β2 to be positive
if the corruption story is relevant:30
excijkt = θj + θk + θt + θjt +Xijtβ1 + (Xijt × InstCorrjt) β2 + εijk. (6)
The results are in columns 4 to 6 of Table 1. In column 4, contract
value becomes negative, while its interaction with corruption is positive and
significant at the 1% level. This confirms that the link between frequent
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interactions and exceptional purchases is mediated by corruption. This effect
remains significant with institution- and goods-specific time trends in column
5 and, more strikingly, with firm fixed effects, in column 6.31
This first set of result support the corruption hypothesis and gives us
more confidence that corruption is the relevant explanation. Of course, de-
spite being more satisfactory than usual subjective indicators, we cannot
completely rule out endogeneity of the corruption measure used here, and
finding appropriate instruments appears difficult.32
Alternative interpretations for the results that frequent pair interactions
lead to more contracts through the exception include first a “reputation”
effect. In circumstances where public institutions need to use exceptional
mechanisms, for example because of some social emergency, they may turn
to firms they have had frequent interactions with, because they know these
are more reliable. Another explanation involves simple inefficiency or passive
waste, as Bandiera et al. (2009) document in the case of public procurement
in Italy. Here, the argument is that procurement officials simply award con-
tracts to firms they already know, because they do not internalize the new
rules or because they are lazy and it is the solution that requires less effort.
To sort out the different explanations, our strategy is to exploit the shock
created by the publication of the Transparency Paraguay report at the begin-
ning of 2006, which attracted attention to what was considered the excessive
use of exception in public contracting. This prompted debates and comments
in the media and the political arena, as well as incentives for investigative
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journalism in the country to inquire specifically on procurement done through
the exceptional procedure. Our hypothesis is that if exception is indeed a
mean to make corrupt deals, the institution-firm pairs that were using ex-
ception frequently should display greater reductions in its use as a result
of this shock. In other words, we hypothesize that where the use of excep-
tion was motivated by corrupt deals, the higher risk of being discovered and
sanctioned brought about by increased public scrutiny should have gener-
ated a stronger decrease in its use than where it was motivated by justifiable
reasons.
The resulting difference-in-differences strategy thus should display a pos-
itive coefficient based on this differential effect, even in the case where the
report implied an overall reduction in exceptional purchase. From a theory
point of view, this corresponds to the monitoring shock shifting the detection
function for a subset of firm-institution pairs, as described in proposition 2
above. Alternatively, if the explanation for high levels of exception is sim-
ply inefficiency, or if the decrease results from a learning process, we should
observe a reduction in its use across the board, and the diff-in-diff estimator
should not be significant.
Table 2, in which we run the basic estimations of Table 1, columns
1 to 3, over the separate subperiods 2004-2005 and 2006-2007, provides a
first illustration. Over the period 2004-2005, the variables proxying for fre-
quent/intense firm-institution relationship, i.e., the total value of pair’s trans-
actions and the share of institutions’ transactions done with each particular
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provider, are significant 5 times out of 6, including in specifications with firm
fixed effects, in column 3. On the contrary, they are almost never significant
in the period 2006-2007, and even become negative with firm fixed effects
in column 6.33 In the first sub-period, a one standard deviation in value of
pair’s transactions reduces the average use of exception by between 3 and
4%, while the same effect is more than an order of magnitude smaller in the
second sub-period. The magnitude of the effect is similarly smaller when
looking at shares.
[insert Table 2 here]
In Table 3, we present the results from a formal differences-in-differences
based on these insights. We estimate the following regression, where β3 is
the diff-in-diff estimator:
excijk = β0 + β1D0607 + β2DT + β3(D0607 ×DT ) + εijk > 0, (7)
For the sake of robustness, we consider three alternative ways to construct
our treatment group of institution-firm pairs: based on high-volume, high
share of institutions’ budget, and high use of exception in the 2004-2005
period (see appendix for details).
[insert Table 3 here]
The results in table 3 are striking. In column 1, the treatment group
includes institution-firm pairs with total transactions value above the me-
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dian in the first period; the diff-in-diff estimator is negative and significant
at the 1% value, and indicates that the treatment group reduces its average
contracting by exception by close to 4%. The result is more telling when
translated in terms of amounts: for the treatment group, the value of trans-
actions made by exception goes from representing 23.2% of the total in the
first period to only 12.2% in the second period. This 9 percentage points
(pp) reduction should be compared with that of the control group which is
only 4.3 pp (from 16 to 11.7% of the total).
A similarly strong result emerges in column 2 when using instead the
share of institutions’ budget as our treatment criteria. There is a decrease
between the two periods, significant at the 1% level. The size of the effect is
similar, as the treatment group experiences a reduction in the value share of
exception of 10.2 pp, while the corresponding control group reduction is of
3.4 pp.34
In column 3, we experiment with yet another definition of the treatment
group, based on the use of exception in the base period. The result again
strongly support our hypothesis: the diff-in-diff estimator is negative and
significant at the 1% level, with a probability reduction of 14%. In terms of
amounts, the treatment group value share of exception diminishes from 50.9
to 7.3%, while for the control group it experiences an increase from 1.4 to
19.9%.
Columns 4 presents the case where the treatment is defined on the basis
of the share of exception in a pair’s transaction being above the average.
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Again, the diff-in-diff coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level,
indicating a probability decrease of 21%. The changes in terms of amounts
are very close to those of column 3. Finally, column 5 provide an additional
robustness check, by restricting the base sample to pairs that have strictly
positive exception use in the period 2004-2005, with again very similar results:
a probability decrease of 15%, significant at the 1% level.
Finally, in the last line of Table 3, we also report the results from similar
specifications with a continuous version of the treatment variables. The
complete set of results are on line with those of the discrete version.
Additional technical details and robustness tests, including the way treat-
ment groups are constructed, and a comparison of pre-treatment trends be-
tween treatment and control groups, supporting the idea that the report’s
publication can be viewed as a natural experiment, are also provided in the
Appendix.
In the next Section, we turn to show how the corrupt practices docu-
mented above distort the profitability of firms.
7 The Profitability of Firms
The model’s second set of predictions is that, as a result of the corrupt prac-
tices unveiled above, entrepreneurs doing business with public institutions
are more profitable than their counterparts serving private demand. More-
over, the most able entrepreneurs are expected to self-select into the more
28
profitable procurement activities, as only they are efficient enough to afford
both the production cost and the bribes to public officials.
Profitability in the rent sector : We first perform a reduced form analysis
of the effect on firms’ profits of a number of variables, derived from the results
in the previous section. As a proxy for the share of “favoured” contracts in
the firm’s portfolio, we use the share of a firm’s contracts made through the
exception, and the weighted average level of corruption of the institutions it
deals with (where the weights are the share of the sales to these institutions
in the firm’s total sales). In addition, we also use firms’ amount and number
of contracts.
The amount of taxes paid provides a reasonable approximation for profits
because the tax rate on gains is flat and uniform in each period (30% in 2004,
20% in 2005, 10% in 2006 and 2007). While the inclusion of other taxes
(among which custom duties are by far the largest component) introduces
some noise in the mapping between profits and taxes paid, we control for
total imports in all estimations to minimize this issue. The model we want
to estimate is:
Git = α + β1Zit + β2Mit +Xitβ3 + θt + εit, (8)
where Git denotes the net gains of firm i in year t, Zit is the variable of interest
(alternatively, the share of sales through the exception, average corruption of
buyers, total sales to the state, number of contracts), Mit is the total amount
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imported, Xit is a vector of control variables, and θt are time fixed effects.
However, the income tax and other taxes are amalgamated in the tax
data, so we only observe:
Tit = xtGit + δiMit + νit, (9)
where xt = 0.3 for 2004, xt = 0.2 for 2005, and xt = 0.1 for 2006 and 2007.
In order to obtain the firms’ net gains we therefore divide the total amount
paid in taxes by the corresponding tax rates.
We thus test the following specification:




under the assumption that Zit is uncorrelated with νit.
The distribution of profits resulting from the available data is truncated
at a strictly positive point. Moreover, the set of firms for which we have non-
zero tax data is not constant over time. This forces us to restrict the panel
to the subset of strictly positive tax observations.35 As a result, we obtain an
unbalanced panel of 2167 observations across 4 years for 1017 private firms.
One worry is that unobserved firm characteristics might be correlated
both with the amount of taxes paid and with some of the Zit variables on the
right hand side.36 For example, more efficient entrepreneurs might be more
successful in general, hence pay more taxes, and also win more procurement
contracts or be more frequently favoured through exception because of their
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good reputation. Another concern is related to firm size. Indeed, bigger
firms may have larger overall profits and also be in a better position to
win procurement contracts or to respond to emergency calls from public
institutions. To address such issues, we add firm level fixed effects θi to (10),
exploiting the panel dimension of the data to wash out any time invariant
firm-level unobserved characteristics.37
The results in Table 4 support our hypotheses. Column 1 shows that
firm’s profits are significantly increasing in the share of its contracts made
by exceptional purchase. The average marginal effect implies that a 1 percent
increase in the share of contracts made by exception corresponds to Gs. 28
millions (US$ 5,600) additional profits.
In column 2, the correlation between the average level of corruption of
public buyers and firms’ profitability is positive but only nearly significant
at conventional levels, which is not surprising given that the sample size is
reduced to 261 since corruption indices are not available for all institutions.
[insert Table 4 here]
Finally, in columns 3 and 4, we look directly at the correlation between
firms’ profits and their procurement activity. The coefficients of both the
amounts sold and the number of contracts are positive and significant. In
terms of marginal effects, every additional Gs. sold to the state translates into
a Gs. 0.29 increase in profits, i.e., a rate of return on procurement operations
of nearly 29%, while a firm obtaining an additional contract increases its
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profits by Gs. 154 millions (approx. US$ 30,800).38
These results, together with those of the previous Section showing that
firms with bigger procurement portfolios are more likely to enter in side
deals, imply that average profitability should be higher in procurement than
in private markets.39 In turn, this is likely to distort firms’ incentives and
induce additional entry of potential entrepreneurs into these sectors. Next,
we provide evidence of this self-selection process.
Misallocation of Talents : An important point of the model is that firms’
unobserved attributes (entrepreneurial or networking skills, efficiency, etc.)
should explain part of their increased profitability due to a self-selection
process. Some of the best entrepreneurs are attracted to sectors where they
can benefit from the corrupt allocation of procurement contracts, resulting
in a misallocation of talents in the economy.
The following test explicitly addresses the process of self-selection into
the procurement sector, using a procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p
631).40 This entails estimating first a probit model to explain the fact that
firms intervene in the procurement sector or not:
Yi = 1 [Y
∗
i = θ0 +Xiθ1 + Siθ2 + ei > 0] , (11)
where Yi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm sells to public institutions
at any point during the sample period, Xi is a vector of firm-level observables,
and Si is a set of instruments. From (11), we derive φ̂, the predicted density
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and Φ̂, the corresponding predicted cumulative density. We then estimate,
for each year, the following tobit model:
Git = max
[
0, α + β1Zit +Xitβ2 + β3Yi
φ̂
Φ̂
+ β4 (1− Yi) φ̂
1− Φ̂ + εit
]
. (12)
Remember that Git denotes the net gains of firm i in year t, Zit is either
total firm’s sales to the state or its total number of contracts, and Xit is a
vector of control variables. We are interested in the statistical significance
of the two last regressors, as an indication of self-selection, as well as in how
their inclusion will affect the coefficient β1.
The crucial point is the availability of suitable instruments, that would
predict access to the procurement sector, while being excludable from the
second equation (12). To generate these, we exploit the fact that apart
from raising the cost of procurement and changing the identity of sellers,
corruption also distorts the sectorial abundance of firms. We capture this bias
by exploiting firms’ names, which are specific to the procurement categories
where a large number of firms are active.41
The probit model shows that our names variables are very strong predic-
tors of firms being active in procurement, while there is no reason to think
that names influence firms’ profitability directly, supporting the excludability
requirements.42
Table 5 shows the results from estimating (12) on a sample of 12,759 firms.
For each year, we first display the results from a standard tobit estimation
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and then provide the results including self-selection correction terms, with
bootstrapped standard errors. Panel 1 uses the total volume of procurement
contracts as our variable of interest Zit, while panel 2 uses the total number
of contracts.
[insert Table 5 here]
The correction terms are strongly (jointly) significant (at the 1% level) in
all estimations. Moreover, their inclusion systematically induces a reduction
in the estimated coefficients of the variables of interest. The marginal effect
of firms’ contract volume on their profitability is reduced by between 9 and
19% (except in 2005, when it remains constant), and loses significance in the
last three years. Similarly, the marginal effect of the number of contracts
is reduced by between 19 and 42%, and becomes insignificant in the 2005
sample. There is thus a strong composition effect, meaning that the prof-
itability advantage of better entrepreneurs stems from an unobserved ability
differential.
We thus conclude that part of the link between procurement and firms’
profitability relates to unobserved self-selection of the best entrepreneurs
into activities that offer privileged access to the procurement sector. This
provides the final element of our story, in which would-be entrepreneurs are
likely to be disproportionately attracted to sectors in which strong demand
from corrupt public buyers generate opportunities for rent-seeking.
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8 Conclusion
We have illustrated the fact that rent-seeking is costly to development, by
showing how entrepreneurs’ economic incentives are distorted toward less
productive activities as the result of favoritism in the allocation of public
contracts in Paraguay. After building an entrepreneurial choice model, we
have used a large scale microeconomic database including all public procure-
ment operations over a 4 year period to test the predictions of the model.
Firms have a greater probability of obtaining a contract directly through
an exceptional procedure from an institution with which they have a strong
contractual relation, both in terms of the total value and frequency of trans-
actions, particularly when dealing with more corrupt State entities. This
is supported by the evidence from a natural experiment, which exogenously
increased public scrutiny over procurement practices, and especially excep-
tion, halfway through our period of study. Firms trading more with the
public sector are more profitable, even when controlling for their unobserved
characteristics. This overall picture embodies the consequences of a system-
atic misallocation of talents a` la Murphy et al. (1991).
While the results must be qualified because of the intrinsic limitations of
the data, in particular those related to corruption and to the profitability of
firms, we think that the paper points to two main conclusions. First, rent-
seeking is costly because it destroys the development potential of the best
entrepreneurs. Indeed, the Paraguayan entrepreneurial class is in its large
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majority imports-oriented, with over 90% of the top 500 taxpayers being
importers. Over the period 1996-2005, the commercial balance displayed an
average deficit of 8.5% of GDP. Large rents linked to the resale of imported
goods to the State and the historical absence of an import-substitution strat-
egy have contributed to make Paraguay one of the least industrialized econ-
omy in South America as, apart from the soybean and meat sectors, its
entrepreneurs have systematically specialized in commercial intermediation,
often with the public sector, rather than in production.43
The costs of this productive atrophy and biased specialization are re-
flected in the poor record of economic growth. After a period of significant
growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, linked in particular to the massive
construction projects including the hydroelectric dams, the average rate of
growth of per capita income was only 0.8% over the 1980s and strictly neg-
ative after that (-0.1% and -0.6% over the 1990s and 2000s). Over the last
two decades, the Paraguayan Central Bank indicates that 92% of growth
fluctuations were due directly to fluctuation in agricultural production and
exports. As a result, per capita income was lower in real terms in 2005 than
it was at the beginning of the 1980s.
Second, the release on an NGO report on the abuse of exceptional pro-
cedures, appears to have had a significant effect as it translated in an im-
provement in the following period. In that sense, civil society involvement




1The “contracting homeland”, see for example Alfredo Boccia Paz, Diario Ultima Hora,
Asuncion, March 4th, 2009.
2Authoritative surveys on corruption include Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999),
Svensson (2005), Pande (2008), and Olken and Pande (2012) among others. There is a
large macro literature, staring with Mauro (1995), while micro-econometric papers include
Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Olken (2007), Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna and Mullainathan
(2007), Ferraz and Finan (2007), and Sequeira (2014) to mention only a few.
3Related papers are Rama (1993), who tracks the number of foreign-trade rent-seeking
regulations over the XXth century in Uruguay and relates these to political and economic
variables, and Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2010), who present cross-country, industry level
evidence of the effect of regulatory distortions on the industrial structure.
4It has lingered in the bottom 4% of surveyed countries included in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index since its inclusion in 2002. It had for instance
a score of 2.1 in 2005, placing it 144th out of 158, and the same score in 2009 (154th out
of 180). See the online Appendix for general information on the country.
5See Straub (2014) for evidence on the change in the relevance of political connections
for public procurement around the 2008 elections, in which the Colorado party lost power.
6For example during the period 2004-2005 public firms awarded close to 90% of their
advertisement contracts through exceptions. As for specific institution, the Office of the
First Lady spent respectively 40% and 93% of its budget in these two years using the
exceptional mechanism. Some cases have made headlines, such as the use of this procedure
to pay close to US$ 100,000 to a consulting firm formerly owned by the President, for the
organization of the XIIIth conference gathering Americas’ First Ladies in 2005 in Asuncio´n
(Diario Ultima Hora, Asuncio´n, June 7th, 2007). See Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2012) for
similar stories in the Russian context.
7Diario ABC Color, Asuncio´n, January 3rd, 2010. These figures are consistent with
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the estimation by Auriol (2006) and with the results in Section 7 below.
8This assumption is consistent with existing evidence on manufacturing and service
firms in developing countries, whether they belong to the formal or the informal sector
(see Tybout, 2000). It is also consistent with the nature of activities included in our
procurement database.
9Empirically Chong et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between the use of ne-
gotiated procedures without prior notification and the weakness of governance across the
European Union: in countries more prone to corruption, public purchasers use more often
exceptional purchase. This is consistent with earlier findings by Della Porta and Rose-
Ackerman (2002) who show that in the 1990s in Italy public authorities were abusing
emergency procurement procedures to bypass competition.
10For instance Tran (2011), exploiting an Asian trading firm’s records of the bribes it
paid over the year to secure public contracts, shows that the average kickback was 14.7
percent of the product cost when auctions were not required. Ufere et al. (2012) provides
insights about the supply of bribes by firms.
11This is a common assumption in the corruption literature, going back to the Becker and
Stigler (1974) crime-deterrence model. See for example Besley and MacLaren (1993) and
Mookherjee and Png (1995). Di Tella and Schardgrosky (2004) is an empirical application.
Wade (1985) is an early reference on the behavior of corrupt government officials, and
Elbahnasawy (2014) looks at the impact of e-government in deterring corruption.
12Equivalently the probability of detection increases with the share of firms that are
excluded from the rent sector, which by virtue of equation (2) is equal to c−c
r(b)
c = b.
When the number of firms that are excluded from the rent sector b is large it increases
the probability of outcry and detection G(b).
13The monotone hazard rate property is equivalent to the log-concavity of the relia-
bility function 1-G(b). It turns out that most reliability functions of standard random
variable are log concave. This is true for distributions such as uniform, normal, logistic,
extreme-value, Chi-Square, Chi, exponential, Laplace, Weibull, power function, gamma,
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beta, Pareto, log-normal, Student’s t, Cauchy and F distributions (Bagnoli and Bergstrom,
2005, and Borzadaran and Borzadaran, 2011).
14In Paraguay at the time of our study, there had been very few cases of prosecution or
indictment for corruption leading to jail time or fines.
15Indeed under assumption A2, 1−G(b)g(b) decreases in b, while b increases in [0, 1]. Moreover
1
g(0) > 0 and
1−G(1)
g(1) = 0 < 1 so that these two functions cross once and only once in (0, 1).
16In the public segment, corruption implies that unit price is c. In the private segment
price is pr = c(1− br) as the less efficient firms are left to serve private consumers. Since
pr > p∗, quantities exchanged in the private sector fall so that the formal productive sector
shrinks.
17Let K(.) and G(.) be two probability functions so that g(b)1−G(b) ≤ k(b)1−K(b) ∀b ∈ [0, 1],
then it implies that G(b) ≤ K(b) ∀b ∈ [0, 1] (e.g., see Nanda and Shaked, 2001).





which by virtue of equation (2) is equivalent to Q = q(1− b).
19See the Online Appendix for more details on the different types of data.
20The data we use was initially painstakingly compiled by Transparencia Paraguay (TP),
the national chapter of the international NGO Transparency International, using the in-
formation published on the DNCP web site.
21The Guarani-US$ exchange rate over the period fluctuated in the range 5,021 to 6,178
Gs. for 1$.
22As a way to index it to the general evolution of prices, contract values and thresholds
are expressed in minimum daily wage (mdw) units, so for example a 1,000,000 Gs. contract
expressed in multiples of a legal mdw of 50,000 Gs. would amount to 20 mdw. See the
Online Appendix for more details.
23Systematic data on total sales, profits, etc., for the whole universe of firms could not
be accessed due to confidentiality restrictions.
24FOB is the standard way to report import values without costs of transport and other
taxes, while CIF is the standard way to report export values, including cost, insurance
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and freight to the national border.
25Barbosa and Straub (2014).
26See European Commission (2011).
27The inclusion of fixed effects prevents us from using a probit estimation, while a
conditional logit would imply eliminating any pair for which there is no within variation,
therefore reducing the final sample by approximately half.
28Here, identification arises from both cross-sectional and time variation of the amount
of exception used across institution-firm pairs, controlling for a time trend, and institution
and goods time-invariant levels (column 1) as well as institution- and good-specific time
trends (column 2).
29Note that the identification of the nature of the relationship between public buyers
and suppliers is beyond the possibilities of our data. It maybe for example that public
officials or their family members have direct stakes in the supplying firms, as the anecdotal
evidence suggests, or that they operate at arm-length and share bribes.
30Note that institution-year fixed effects absorb the direct effect of corruption, which is
measured year by year. The pairwise correlations between the Corrjt and the Xijt vari-
ables are -0.003 and -0.04 respectively, so we are not worried by potential multicollinearity.
31Note that running the specifications of columns 1 to 3 on the smaller sample of columns
4 to 6 confirms a positive (approximately an additional 10% for a one standard value
increase) and significant effect for the total pairs’ contract value.
32The news index might be particularly subject to caution, as press coverage of specific
institutions, based for example on journalists inquiries or on denunciations, is likely to
be influenced by the nature of the institutions and their past behavior in procurement
or other activities. Using only the mean of the evaluations based on the Comptroller
General’s report and on the number of administrative indictments in any given institution
yields similar results though.
33The exception if the coefficient for the share of institutions’ budget made with the
firm, in column 5, which is significant at the 10% level.
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34Note also that the other coefficients support our previous insights: the control group-
specific trend β1 is not significantly different from 0, supporting the idea that the meaning-
ful reduction occurs in the identified treatment group, while β2 is positive and significant,
supporting our previous results on the fact that pairs with frequent/intense interactions
make more use of the exception in the period 2004-2005.
35Using all the observations to measure the variations in net gains, we would have
some positive measurement errors (when a firm’s tax observation is out of the sample and
therefore set at zero for one year and is positive the following one), some negative ones (in
the reverse case), and more generally errors going either way for firms that do not make
it to the ranking of top taxpayers.
36Note however that such endogeneity concerns are much less obvious for variables such
as the average level of corruption.
37We do not have additional firm-level data to control for such general characteristics.
Fixed effects will take care of the size issue as long as it is reasonably constant over the
period of study.
38Results not shown here to save space indicate that the results in columns 1 and 2 are
robust to systematically controlling for the amounts of firms’ sales to the State.
39A technical concern has to do with tax evasion. Indeed, it is likely that Paraguayan
firms do not report all of their sales for tax purpose, possibly biasing our estimations.
One could think that sales to the State, because they are publicly registered, imply lower
rates of evasion than other sales, in which case we may be facing an upward bias in our
estimations. However, strong anecdotal evidence rather suggest that well-connected firms
use their influence to evade a bigger share of their tax obligations. This leads us to think
that our estimates should be considered as a lower bound on the true returns of these
firms. In other words, the fact that we still find a positive effect of public contracts on
profits leads us to consider that the true effect is probably even larger.
40The procedure, which aims to correct for the failure of the ignorability-of-treatment
assumption, is a kind of extended Heckit, where sample selection is viewed as an omit-
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ted variable bias, addressed by the inclusion of the Mills ratio as additional regressors.
Fafchamps and La Ferrara (2012) apply this technique to control for individuals’ self-
selection into self-help groups based on unobservable characteristics.
41See the Appendix for the details on how the instruments are defined, descriptive
statistics and first stage estimations.
42The dummies for the “construction” and “consultancy” categories correlate negatively
with profits. Moreover, the results are robust to excluding the import-export category.
43This has also fueled a flourishing and illegal reexportation business to the neighbors
Brazil and Argentina. See Straub (1998) for more details on this.
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Online Appendix (not for publication)
1 Paraguay: Country Overview
Paraguay is a small landlocked country of 6.2 million inhabitants (2008) lo-
cated in the heart of South America. With a per capita GDP of US$ 1,670 in
2008, it is a low-middle income country. Its main sources of growth are agrar-
ian activities and local services. Indeed, a few non-processed commodities
constitute its very narrow export base: 50% of all exports are in 3 traditional
products (soy, cotton and meat); adding other barely processed commodities
makes up close to 90% of total exports.
The country also enjoys a unique source of rent in the form of revenues
from big hydroelectric dams shared with its neighbors Argentina and Brazil.
The biggest one is Itaipú, on the river Paraná between Paraguay and Brazil.
Until the Chinese Three Gorges dam was built, Itaipú was the largest hy-
droelectric power plant in the world. It has 20 turbines, 1 of which provides
90% of all the energy used in Paraguay. The rest is channeled to Brazil.
Additionally, there is another huge dam, the Yacyreta one, lower down on
the same river, on the border between Paraguay and Argentina. It is about
one fourth the size of Itaipú. In exchange, Paraguay receives every year an
enormous amount of royalties, amounting to US$ 366 millions in 2005 (resp.
US$ 553 millions in 2006), equivalent to 4.9% (resp. 5.8%) of GDP. This is
approximately 50% of the total government tax collection (from VAT, custom
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duties, and corporate income, by order of magnitude).
Politically, after enduring the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner between
1954 and 1989, Paraguay returned to democracy through a military coup
in 1989. Yet, the Asociación Nacional Republicana, traditionally known as
Colorado Party, managed to retain power for 61 years, including the 19 years
elapsed since the 1989 coup and covering the whole period of our study (See
Pérez-Liñán et al., 2006, for a description of the political environment of
Paraguay).
Given this political context, the dams’ propitious source of income shaped
the growth of the Paraguayan “rent-seeking economy”. First, the dams’ con-
struction fostered a culture of intense rent-seeking and corruption and allowed
a few entrepreneurs that were on good terms with the dictator to become
immensely rich. Second, the free flow of resources to the government’s bud-
get meant that bureaucrats were in a position to favor friends through public
expenses. During the whole period, the party effectively “privatized” public
resources, using public employment and procurement to favor party members
(Nickson and Lambert, 2002).
2 Data
Legal requirements for public procurement purchases
The 2.051/03 law of Public Procurement aims to promote competition
among state providers and transparency in the procurement process. To this
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end, it regulates purchases differently according to their value.
The largest contracts (above 10,000 mdw; see Table A1 below) are made
through a Public Tendering. Calls for offers on such contracts must be pub-
lished in the national press for a minimum of three days on top of the usual
publication in the official newsletter and web site. The requirements and
criteria for evaluation must be restricted to technically indispensable requi-
sites. Grounds for disqualification must concern the failure to comply with
substantial requisites, such as threatening the legality or solvency of the pro-
posal. In this way calculus mistakes or mistakes in the layout of the offer,
which were often used to justify dismissal of an offer are no longer considered
valid grounds. If two or more offers comply with the technical requirements,
the offer with the lowest price wins. Bids and the winning offer are published
on the web site.
The competitive bidding process (between 2,000 and 10,000 mdw) does
not require a call for offers in the national press. However five different firms
have to make offers and the call must be published on the web for any firm,
which might qualify to participate in the bidding.
When the value of the contract does not reach 2,000 mdw, the contracting
institution can allocate the contract directly to a firm without organizing an
auction. It must however have published the call on the official web site and
have received at least three official offers from different firms. For contracts
worth less than 20 mdw a ‘fixed funds’ mechanism was created to allow insti-
tutions to purchase directly from a single supplier without justification. This
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mechanism has no specific requirement on the number of offers or publication
of the call for offers. We include it as a direct purchase.
Finally, in order to bypass costly administrative procedures in cases of
“force majeure”, the exceptional purchase mechanism described in the text
was created. Under this regime, institutions can purchase as much as they
want from a firm of their choice. The law stipulates that a report explaining
the reasons of the purchase and justifying the choice of provider should be
supplied to the national watchdog within a month after the date of purchase.
In practice, this is rarely done.
Table A1 summarizes the evolution of the Paraguayan minimum daily




The institutions for which this data is available are Customs, the Sen-
ate, the Ministry of Education, the Supreme Court, the Social Prevision
Institute, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Housing Council, the
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, the Superior Tribunal for Elec-
toral Justice, the National Institute for Rural Land Development, the Public
Ministry (Public Prosecutors’ Office), and the Police (which belongs to the
Ministry of Interior).
There are three tentative measures of corruption: the news index, which
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counts the number of newspaper articles referring to corruption cases involv-
ing each specific institution, published in the 3 main national newspapers
each year; the control index, based on the Comptroller General’s (the “con-
traloria”) evaluation of each institution; and the trial index, summarizing
the number of outstanding administrative corruption cases in any given ad-
ministration. We rescale all indices on a 0-10 scale, with 10 representing
more corruption. The appeal of these indices, contrary to those based on
perceptions of corruption, is the objectivity of the criteria used to construct
them. More importantly, our theory calls for a measure of the probability of
detection at the institution level, which is well captured by these indices as
they are widely advertised.
3 Empirical Evidence. Complements
Difference-in-Differences
We contruct the control and the treatment groups in the following ways.
Consider for example our first criteria, the total value of each pair’s trans-
actions. We define the treatment group, identified by a dummy variable
DT = 1, as being composed of the pairs with a value exceeding the median
value in the 2004-2005 sample, while those below this threshold are in the
control group (DT = 0). We then complete the sample by keeping all the
2006-2007 observations corresponding to institution-firm pairs that were al-
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ready active in 2004-2005 and therefore were assigned to either the treatment
or the control. In practice, this implies dropping pairs that were not active
in the first period because the firms had not won any contract from that
specific institution. Our final sample contains 37,453 observations, covering
79% of the initial ones. More specifically, 60% of the contracts made over
2006-2007 involved pairs that were already active before.
For the second criteria, we assign to treatment pairs with a share of
institutions’ budget above the sample median.
The third criteria experiments with yet another definition of the treat-
ment group, based on the use of exception in the base period. Inclusion into
treatment is now based on the total value of a pair’s contract by exception
being above the average in the base sample (the median is 0, as a majority a
firms, mostly the ones having only one or few contracts, make no use of the
exception).
The fourth criteria defines inclusion into the treatment group on the basis
of the share of exception in a pair’s transaction being above the average.
Finally, criteria five is similar, but restricting the sample to pairs having
made at least one contract by exception in this period, and defining the
treatment group with respect to the share of exception in a pair’s transaction
in this subsample (the threshold is the average, equal to 0.7, as the median
is now 1). This is meant to address the possibility that left censoring at 0 is
somewhat biasing our results in the sense that it prevents pairs in the control
group to further reduce their use of exception. This reduces the sample of
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eligible pairs to 13,709.
In our estimating equation, D0607 is a dummy variable taking value 1
for the period 2006-2007, and DT is our treatment group as defined in one
of the ways mentioned above. β3 is the differences-in-differences estimator.
Note that the coefficient of D0607, β1, captures the control group-specific
trend between the two periods, while the coefficient of DT , β2, gives us the
difference in the use of exception between the treatment and the control
group in the base period (2004-2005). Finally, all estimations include the full
set of institutions, goods, and firms fixed effects.
Finally, note that to be valid our diff-in-diff strategy requires that the
treatment and the control groups have similar trends before the release of
the Transparency Paraguay report. This can be tested using the data for 2004
and 2005. The bottom lines of Table 3, show the coefficient and standard
errors of β3 from a similar estimation as (7) on the sample restricted to 2004
and 2005, where the D0607 dummy has been replaced by a dummy taking
value one for 2005 and 0 for 2004. All the coefficient are positive and not
significant (with the exception of the one in column 4, at the 10% level),
showing that there is no differential trend over these two years, whatever the
way our treatment and control group are defined.
Self-selection dummies
First, there is a large number of contracts in office and machinery cate-
gories sold by commercial intermediaries; locally, these are often nicknamed
“suitcase firms”, because they specialize in importing and selling any item
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upon request. For example, one of the firm in our sample, run by a member
of the close circuit of the former president (also member of the Masonic loge
and honorary consul of an Eastern European country), won 301 contracts
between 2004 and 2007, for close to $1.45m worth of office supplies, elec-
tric material, cooking utensils, textile, chemical products, cleaning products,
computing equipment, Paraguayan flags, etc.
Next, many contracts are in the construction and maintenance categories.
Finally, we also focus on services provided by consulting firms (Mironov and
Zhuravskaya, 2012, show for Russia that phantom consulting firms are often
used to channel corrupt deals involving procurement funds).
For each of these three groups, we define sets of related words and create
three dummy variables, equal to one if at least one of the specific words
appears in the firms’ official denomination. The keywords are chosen so as
to match standard names used by firms in the relevant sectors of activities
(allowing for variations such as abbreviations):
• “Import-export” dummy: ferretería, comercial, distribuidora, casa, rep-
resentación, servicio, supply, venta, supermercado, material, pieza, trade,
import, export.
• “Construction and maintenance” dummy: ingeniero, arquitecto, mecanico,
taller, repuesto.
• “Consulting” dummy: abogado, auditor, consultor, asociados, asesor,
comunicación.
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Table A2 shows how these categories of firms are represented among state
providers and non state providers respectively.
(Table A2 here)
Concerning excludability, as stated in the text, there is no reason why
firms names would influence their profitability directly, other than through
the nature of their branch of activity (the “construction” and “consultancy”
dummies are actually negatively correlated with firm-level gains). The “import-
export” dummy can be discussed on the ground that it may affect profitabil-
ity through a distinct channel, namely the fact that firms in these activities
could also be benefiting from the widespread smuggling rents available in
the Paraguayan economy. To address this concern, we rerun the estimations
excluding this variable from the set of instruments. Results, not shown here
to save space, are almost identical to those in Table 5. Table A3 presents the




Table A1: Minimum daily wage, exchange rate and procurement thresholds 
 Until April 2004 April 2004 to March 
2006 




Mdw in Gs. Gs. 37,401 Gs. 41,889 Gs. 46,915 Gs. 51,607 
Mdw in US$  6.28 6.78 - 7.47 8.37 - 9.34 10.28 
Exchange rate 
bounds 1$ = Gs. 5,955 
Gs. 5,608 < 1$ < Gs. 
6,178 
Gs. 5,021 < 1$ < Gs. 
5,608 
 
1$ = Gs. 5,021 
  Procurement thresholds (US$)  
20 mdw 125.6 135.6 – 149.4 167.4 – 186.8 205.6 
2,000 mdw 12,560 13,560 – 14,940 16,740 – 18,680 20,560 
10,000 mdw 62,800 67,800 – 74,700 83,700 – 93,400 100,280 
Note: Average exchange rate provided by BCP (Paraguay Central Bank), 1US$ = Gs. 5955 in 2004,  
1 US$ = Gs.6178 in 2005, 1US$ = Gs. 5608 in 2006, 1 US$ = Gs.5021 in 2007. 
Table A2: Distribution of self-selection dummies  
State  providers 0 1 Total 
Import-export    
0 7,035 (97.1%) 4,170 (75.7%) 11,745 
1 213 (2.9%) 801 (24.3%) 1,014 
Construction and maintenance    
0 7,224 (99.7%) 4,983 (90.4%) 12,207 
1 24 (0.3%) 528 (9.6%) 552 
Consulting    
0 7,246 (99.97%) 5,277 (95.8%) 12,523 
1 2 (0.03%) 234 (4.2%) 236 
Total 7,248 5,511 12,759 
Note: In each cell, the number in parenthesis indicates the share of firms  with or without the name attribute, as a  
percentage of the total of firms in the category (state provider or not). For example, firms in the “impexp” category  
represent 2.9% (213/7248) of non state providers,  and 24.3% (801/5511) of state providers. 
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Table A3 : Probit model of firms’ intervention in procurement 
 
(1) (2) 
 State provider dummy State provider dummy 
Import-export 1.051  
 
(0.080)***  
Construction and maintenance 1.540 1.781 
 
(0.164)*** (0.163)*** 
Consulting 2.244 2.170 
 
(0.547)*** (0.542)*** 
Importer -2.414 -2.415 
 
(0.036)*** (0.034)*** 
Exporter -1.235 -1.241 
 
(0.074)*** (0.076)*** 
Constant 1.303 1.379 
 
(0.026)*** (0.025)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.53 0.51 
Observations 12759 12759 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%. 
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